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I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified 
by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must 
face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical 
representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-
justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to 
each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are 
to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise 
needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument 
content, usually premise material. 
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Michael Scriven, one of the founders of modern informal logic, appears to 
walk right into a trap that Lewis Carroll set 81 years earlier. Scriven says 
“all arguments depend upon the ‘assumption’ that you can get from their 
specific premises to their specific conclusions” (1976, p. 84). Carroll 
(1895) describes an infinite argumentative regress, which can be 
symbolized as follows (the arrow for ‘if-then’), keeping interpretation to 
a minimum: 
 
A: (x)(y)(z)(((x = z) & (y = z))  (x = y)) 
B: (a = c) & (b = c) 
C: (A & B)  Z 
D: (A & B & C)  Z 
. 





 Z: a = b 
The vertical margin dots represent an infinite series of recursive 
iterations in the manner of C and D. We may take the assumption to which 
Scriven refers (he also allows it can be regarded as a “missing premise”) 
first as C for the argument explicitly composed of A, B, and Z; then as D for 
the argument explicitly composed of A, B, C, and Z; and so on. 
In informal logic’s representations of reasoning, infinite regress 
often lurks. In many cases, the regress goes unnoticed. Yet in some cases, 
the regress is noticed, and an explanation and uneasy embrace are 
offered. For instance, Leo and Louis Groarke maintain that “all theories of 
informal argument must face the regress problem” (2002, p. 52). They 
locate the source of the problem in skeptical epistemology, specifically, in 
the fact that any reason given for a claim can itself be subjected to Sextus 
Empiricus’ or the Tortoise’s (in Carroll’s tale) or your child’s interminable 
game of ‘Why?’ The Groarke view is that it is only pragmatic 
“considerations of utility which must bring” these regresses to an end (p. 
56). The main thesis of this paper is that such an approach to the regress 
problem is not only defeatist and excusing, it is misguided, because 
vigilance against representing arguments as self-justifying has the power 
to avert the infinite regress problem. Moreover, what this does not solve 
of the regress problem, is addressed by the theory of epistemic infinitism. 
An organizing principle of this paper will be Johnson & Blair’s 
(1977) widely utilized RSA criteria for argument cogency: the premises 
are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. Similarly, for example, 
Govier (2010, p. 87ff.) advocates ARG “conditions of argument cogency”: 
the premises are to be acceptable and relevant, and provide good grounds 
for the conclusion. One-by-one in the next three sections (2, 3, and 4) we 
will see that infinite regresses of self-justification arise with respect to 
each node of this triad. They arise by confusing a criterion of argument 
evaluation with argument content, usually premise material. This is a 
species of confusing the external with the internal, since as a standard for 
assessing arguments, a criterion of argument evaluation is external to any 
argument. Lastly, section 5 will consider the illumination that the theory 
of epistemic infinitism can shed. Section 2 will also discuss the difference 
between vicious and benign infinite series. 
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2. RELEVANCE AND VICIOUSNESS 
 
Consider what is often cited as the form of argument from analogy: 
Premises: X and Y have certain properties in common; X has some further 
property. Conclusion: Y has the further property as well. Some find this 
structure incomplete because of a concern that having the first properties 
in common might not have anything to do with having the further 
property in common. They therefore add a premise schema to the effect 
that having the first properties in common “is relevant to having” the 
further property in common (Waller, 2001, p. 202; cf., e.g., Walton, Reed, 
& Macagno, 2008, p. 86).  
But this addition is ill-advised, as some appear to see. For 
example, Guarini (2004, p. 163) says with respect to the structure he 
thinks analogical arguments exhibit: “I have not included the claim that 
the features cited in analogical arguments are relevant”, although his 
critics insist the features cited “must be referring to relevant similarities 
and not mere similarities. Just so. However, it does not follow that the 
argument reconstruction must include a relevance claim”. Even leaving 
aside the extent to which Guarini’s concession would make all analogical 
arguments good arguments, his reply is of course weak. He attempts to 
strengthen it as follows: 
 
…there may be a general account available for why we do not 
include relevance claims in argument reconstruction. One of the 
background conditions guiding sincere argumentative 
discourse is that arguers are trying to make claims that are 
relevant to their conclusions. As a general rule, we do not 
include the background conditions for discourse as premises in 
argument reconstruction… 
 
Yet this still does not go far enough, for it would make relevance a mere 
pragmatic condition of “sincere argumentative discourse”, when in fact it 
has a critical logical role. The relevance of the premises to the conclusion 
is itself a general criterion of argument appraisal, as in the RSA criteria 
for argument cogency. Nothing is gained and much is risked by having an 
argument affirm its own quality (on any parameter), in effect ‘patting 
itself on the back’; similarly, naming a store chain “Best Buy” does not 
make it so. If argument from analogy (or any scheme) is construed (per 
above) as incomplete without such a relevance premise, an infinite 
regress of self-justifications appears to be generated. For if the original 
argument is incomplete, then on the same grounds a second premise 
would be needed to affirm the relevance of the first premise claiming 
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relevance, and a third premise needed to affirm the relevance of the 
second premise claiming relevance, and so on without end. 
The solution to this problem is not to postulate a relevance 
premise as part of an argument’s structure in the first place. Relevance 
has an explanatory role as a general criterion of argument appraisal. Its 
presence helps to explain what makes an argument good; its absence 
helps to explain what makes an argument bad. It is confusion to take 
relevance as premise material. 
This helps to elucidate why the regress is vicious, as even the 
name regress suggests: Any alleged progress made in explaining or 
accounting for anything completely disappears in the infinite structure 
for argument from analogy—a chimera made all the more implausible 
because argument from analogy is nondeductive (see section 4). As an 
example for comparison, take the question—what makes an act 
voluntary? You might theorize that an act is voluntary only if it is the 
result of an act of will. Of course for this to work, however, the act of will 
itself must be voluntary. So now the question is—what makes an act of 
will voluntary? Rosenberg argues (1984, p. 62) that “the only course open 
to us is to apply the theory again. When we do so, however, all we find is 
that we need yet another voluntary act of will. The question does not go 
away”. These cases illustrate Olson’s conclusion (1987, p. 50) that 
“strictly speaking, the only vicious regress is a regress of explication…and 
is thus hardly to be distinguished from circularity”. In contrast, no such 
point applies to a benign infinite series, for instance, the fact that every 
counting (or natural) number has exactly one successor counting 
number. This series enhances our understanding; it accurately depicts, 
rather than bloats, ontology. Now Aristotle and other ancients held that 
there cannot be an actual infinity because that would paradoxically 
involve an infinite set of things that is somehow a completed totality. 
Modern mathematicians and others have no such scruples, as with 
various sets of numbers (naturals, irrationals, reals, etc.) and the infinite 
divisibility of continua, not to mention infinities of different sizes 
(cardinalities). Clark (1988, p. 369ff.) thinks that the only vicious infinite 
regress arguments are philosophical arguments, yet there is no formal 
pattern that they all exhibit. A sensible comprehensive perspective is 
offered by Nolan (2001). He argues that the ancient view still has much 
intuitive appeal because we are naturally inclined to parsimony in the 
postulation of entities, hence the notion of Ockham’s razor. He maintains 
(pp. 536-537) that the boundary between the vicious and the benign 
 
might well be this: a regress is taken to be benign when the 
quantitative extravagance is a cost worth paying, and vicious 
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when either the quantitative extravagance is not a cost worth 
paying, or if it has some more serious fault of which the regress 
is evidence (like lurking contradiction or failure as a reductive 
analysis). 
 
Certainly, quantitative extravagance combined with a lack of explanatory 
power is a cost not worth paying, and that is what marks informal logic’s 
infinite regress. 
Up to this point, the argument pattern that this section has 
focused on is analogical argument. However, as we know, the local can 
spread globally. In this vein, consider Hitchcock’s contention that “the 
word ‘so’ when used inferentially implies, as part of its meaning and not 
as some pragmatic implicature of its ordinary use, that the statement 
preceding it is relevant to the statement following it” (2011, p. 214; cf. his 
2007, p. 4). He intends his contention to apply, mutatis mutandis, to any 
argument-indicator term, whether it introduces a conclusion as ‘so’ does, 
or introduces a premise, e.g., ‘since’ (2007, p. 1). Hitchcock’s point is that 
such a term “implies” a proposition about relevance as part of its 
semantic content; the proposition is a positive meta-level comment about 
the argument’s quality on the relevance parameter. As far as I can see, the 
only reason he gives for maintaining this is that an example such as 
“‘snow is white, so grass is green’ is not a good argument” because it has 
“an obviously irrelevant premise” (2007, p. 4; 2011, p. 213). In a manner 
parallel to what we saw specifically for analogical argument, this just 
seems to confuse a general criterion of argument appraisal (relevance) 
with argument content, opening the path of a (vicious) infinite regress of 
self-justifications—what ensures the relevance of the relevance claim 
made by the argument-indicator term (etc.)? Furthermore, because 
Hitchcock’s view does not simply introduce wayward premise material, 
but pertains to the inferential relation per se of any argument (since an 
argument-indicator term is always at least implicit), it apparently has the 
bizarre consequence that one cannot both use language correctly and 
construct an argument that is bad with respect to the relevance of the 
premises to the conclusion. Were it only that all we had to do for our 




In her treatment of presumptions, Bermejo-Luque (2013, p. 1) says that 
in “monological argumentation, presumptions somehow dispense 
arguers from providing further reasons for some of their claims, and this 
seems to be necessary if their arguments are to stop at some point”. Yet 
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exactly how might presumptions do this? I believe she is answering this 
question in proposing “the following definition: a presumption is the 
speech-act of putting forward a proposition as a reasonable assumption” 
(p. 4; cf. 2016, p. 9). But this view has some implications that are 
seemingly absurd. If I am a sincere arguer, and not engaged in 
suppositional reasoning (or indirect or conditional proof), what premises 
would I not ‘put forward as (at least?) reasonable assumptions’? Given a 
sincerity condition, all premises or assumptions of standard arguments 
would appear to be presumptions. 
Bermejo-Luque further explains that “in presuming that p, we are 
saying that it is reasonable to assume that p” (2013, p. 5); we “contend-
that-it-is reasonable—in some particular sense—to assume that p” 
(2016, p. 10). This “saying” or ‘contending’ is semantic content that 
introduces a further proposition that is a meta-level comment on 
assumption p. This looks like a vicious infinite regress. If in presuming 
that p we are saying (p′) that it is reasonable to assume that p, then on the 
same grounds are we also saying (p′′) that it is reasonable to assume that 
p′ (i.e., that it is reasonable to assume that it is reasonable to assume that 
p) and (p′′′) that it is reasonable to assume that p′′…? It is hard to see any 
explanatory power justifying this quantitative extravagance. 
To say of an assumption that it is reasonable seems to be saying 
that it is acceptable. Bermejo-Luque holds that “in most contexts” 
reasonability is epistemic in that true belief is the “pursued end” (2016, 
pp. 11-12). But premise acceptability in this sense is itself a general 
criterion of argument evaluation, as in the RSA criteria for argument 
cogency. Thus, on Bermejo-Luque’s view, it looks like in virtue of making 
a presumption, at least in “most contexts” an argument affirms its own 
quality on the premise-acceptability parameter for that presumption. Yet 
if an argument needs to do this, then likewise it would need to ensure the 
acceptability of this first-level affirmation of acceptability by a second-
level affirmation of the acceptability of the first-level one, and so on 
endlessly. The generality of this regress of self-justifications is clearer if 
you recall (above) that all premises or assumptions of standard 
arguments would appear to be presumptions on Bermejo-Luque’s view, 
given a sincerity condition. 
 
  





The most common view to be considered arises with respect to the RSA 
sufficiency criterion for argument cogency. We saw Scriven express the 
view at the outset of this paper. Perhaps the most succinct contemporary 
expression is Groarke & Groarke’s (2002, p. 51): “Every argument 
assumes that the premises warrant the conclusion”. Others who hold this 
view include Govier (1987, p. 96), Grennan (1994, p. 187), and Hitchcock 
(1998, p. 19). Hitchcock (2007, p. 2; 2011, p. 210) sees the idea  as going 
back to the ancient Stoic logicians, specifically, Diogenes Laertius, who 
says that the argument-indicator term ‘since’ appearing at the beginning 
of a sentence “guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first 
and that the first is really a fact” (VII.71)1. Alternatively, the idea is 
sometimes cast in terms of the arguer, rather than the argument, making 
the assumption or “inference claim”. For example, Hitchcock (2011, p. 86) 
maintains, with respect to argumentation inferences, that “the arguer 
implicitly claims that the conclusion of each constituent argument follows 
from the reason or reasons from which it is drawn”. 
Cast either way, the point is apparently supposed to be obvious, 
because it is usually not otherwise defended. Bermejo-Luque is an 
exception. She says that it is because an “implicit inference-claim can be 
attributed to us…that a mere transition from a cognitive input to a 
cognitive output counts as an act of reasoning, and merely putting 
forward a couple of claims counts as an act of arguing” (2011, p. 90). 
Whatever its defence or lack thereof, the view has become entrenched in 
informal logic to the point where it sometimes even seems to be regarded 
as a matter of descriptive definition rather than theory. Grennan says 
(1997, p. 69): “Consider an argument utterance symbolized as ‘A, so B’. By 
definition, the inference claim is ‘if A then B’”. Grennan goes on to say that 
if we “add” this claim to the argument “in an attempt to make the 
inference claim explicit”, then the argument’s form evidently will be that 
of Modus Ponens. As if by magic, notice, what might have been a 
deductively invalid argument (e.g., where A is true and B is false) becomes 
valid.2 Yet this new argument’s inference claim is “if A and if A then B, then 
                                                             
1 Retrieved from  
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.
0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1, last accessed 22. 02. 2018. 
2 Grennan himself does not discuss this point. Hitchcock, inexplicably as far as I 
can see, expresses a denial of it: adding the “material conditional with the 
conjunction of the explicit premisses as antecedent and the conclusion as 
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B”, and when this is added to the new argument for the same reason—
making the inference claim explicit—an expanded argument and 
corresponding inference claim is generated, and so on, ad infinitum. In 
company with others, Grennan thinks that the way to stop this regress, 
which is akin to the one identified by Lewis Carroll, is simply to neither 
treat the original assumption/inference claim as a premise nor make it 
explicit (cf., e.g., Govier, 1987, pp. 96-97; Bermejo-Luque, 2004, pp. 174-
175).3 
But it is hard to see what an assumption of an argument is if not a 
premise, and it is hard to see what relevant difference it could make 
whether the claim is explicit or implicit. Rather, it seems to me that it is 
again taking situated reasoning to warrant itself—whether 
enthymematically or not—that is the problem. Arguments make no such 
assumption or inference claim as that the premises support the 
conclusion. Instead, in an argument the conclusion is actually inferred 
from the premises (some of which may be implicit); it is not claimed to be 
inferable. The use of an argument-indicator term such as ‘so’, ‘therefore’, 
or ‘since’ means that the arguer is inferring; contra (e.g.) Grennan (1997, 
pp. 69-70), they do not mean that the arguer or argument is making a 
meta-claim that, if true, would warrant this inference (the meta-claim 
being that the premises support the conclusion).4 There is only the 
inference, and if the argument is cogent, the implication relation between 
the premises and the conclusion. It is not because an ‘inference-claim can 
be attributed to us’ but rather it is because an inference can be attributed 
to us “that a mere transition from a cognitive input to a cognitive output 
counts as an act of reasoning, and merely putting forward a couple of 
claims counts as an act of arguing”. There is nothing for such an inference 
claim to do (well, except cause trouble); it has no explanatory value. 
Furthermore, neither arguments nor inferences have a truth-value; 
rather, they are valid or invalid, or cogent or not. Hence, the view that we 
                                                             
consequent…as an extra premiss does not make any previously invalid argument 
valid” (1999, p. 9-10). 
3Notice that this is a different point than the idea that the way to avoid a Carroll-
type regress is not to treat rules of inference as premises, which many have held, 
beginning at least with Russell (1937, pp. 35-36) and Ryle (1950, pp. 306-307). 
The assumption/inference claim referred to in the Groarke & Groarke dictum 
“every argument assumes that the premises warrant the conclusion” is not a rule 
of inference or a generalization about rules of inference. 
4In contrast, a phrase on the order of ‘it follows that…’ of course does make the 
meta-claim that the premises support the conclusion. Could the existence of such 
phrases be the source of the confusion? 
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make an inference claim simply by arguing or inferring represents us as 
doing something we are not doing—making a claim that is true or false. 
None of this is to deny that, by abstraction (as opposed to any act 
on the part of the arguer), every argument has an ‘associated’ or 
‘corresponding’ conditional, in which the antecedent is the conjunction of 
the argument’s premises and the consequent is the argument’s 
conclusion (e.g., C for the argument A-B-Z at the beginning of this paper). 
We might even propose that the arguer is ‘committed’ to this conditional 
insofar as it would be inconsistent for the arguer to deny it (e.g., Ennis, 
1982, p. 83; Berg, 1987, p. 17; Hitchcock, 1999, p. 9). Perhaps this is the 
source of confusion. However, it remains that such an abstraction is in no 
sense part of the argument; thus, neither the argument nor the arguer 
assumes or claims this abstraction, and the vicious regress of self-
justifications never gets started. Besides, if the associated conditional 
were a part of every argument, then, absurdly, would not every argument 
be deductively valid (so much for the problem of demarcating the valid 
from the invalid) and exhibit a single overall form (Modus Ponens)? 
Nor, of course, am I here denying that deductive validity is 
monotonic, “that is, if you start with a deductively valid argument, then, 
no matter what you add to the premises, you will end up with a 
deductively valid argument” (this standard definition is from Sainsbury, 
1991, p. 369). There is no question that adding C, D, etc. to Carroll’s A-B-Z 
argument at the beginning of this paper still gives you a deductively valid 
argument. Botting (2017, p. 35) contends that if you add C, D, etc. here, “it 
is arguable that these are not different arguments, since they each have 
exactly the same informational content”. Botting further holds that in the 
absence of informational ampliation, “it is no problem at all that there 
could be an infinite number of premises”. At a certain level of abstraction, 
this seems true. Needless to say, however, there would be problems if, for 
example, one was engaged in trying to accurately reconstruct a stated 
argument that when stated, was expressed simply along the lines of A-B-
Z. 
The serious mistakes arise in taking any of this to indicate that 
each of C, D, etc. is, as Botting claims, “not an ampliation, but is part of the 
argument’s content and hence part of the argument” (p. 38). In the first 
place, this appears inconsistent: how could C, D, etc. be part of the 
argument’s content yet add nothing to that content (no “ampliation”)? 
Moreover, by definition, if a whole has parts, and some parts are missing 
or not included in the whole, the whole is incomplete. This means that for 
Botting, Carroll’s A-B-Z argument would be incomplete without the 
inclusion of C, D, etc. And since there appears to be nothing relevantly 
special about Carroll’s A-B-Z argument, such a view as Botting’s would 
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mean that at least every deductively valid argument is a vicious infinite 
regress, that is (as we saw in section 2), an infinite series with no 
explanatory power to justify its quantitative extravagance. To this Botting 
has replied (personal correspondence), “C and D are redundant, but are 
part of the content for precisely that reason!” We could go around and 
around, but the underlying problem seems to be a failure to distinguish 
between what can be added to a deductively valid argument (in virtue of 
monotonicity) and what must be added (such that otherwise the 
argument is incomplete). 
 
5. EPISTEMIC INFINITISM AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
My diagnosis of infinite regress in informal logic is that it arises largely by 
confusing an RSA criterion of argument evaluation—whether it be 
relevance, sufficiency, or acceptability—with argument content, usually 
premise material. Such a confusion generates a vicious infinite series of 
self-justifications. The Groarkes, on the other hand, do not even consider 
this possibility. Instead, they locate the source of informal logic’s infinite 
regress in the broad generality that ancient and modern skeptical 
epistemology “can be used to raise doubts about any belief or principle of 
reason, turning any argument into an attempt at justification which is 
never allowed to end.” Accordingly, they say “the regress problem is not 
unique to the theory of informal logic” (2002, p. 53), and “it is a mistake 
to think that there is a way to answer the regress problem on its own 
terms”. Rather, they advocate a pragmatic approach: “we will do better to 
dismiss the problem by appealing to convention and utility” (p. 57). 
Thus, I think that the connection the Groarkes draw between 
skeptical epistemology and infinite regress in informal logic is spurious 
in that there are reasons for informal logic’s regress that are independent 
of skeptical epistemology. Moreover, the Groarkes appear to fail to 
recognize the possible viability of epistemic infinitism, although this is 
perhaps understandable. Klein and Turri say in their article “Infinitism in 
Epistemology” that infinitism had been a neglected theory, but “there has 
been some recent interest in infinitism, beginning when Peter Klein 
published the first in a series of articles defending infinitism (Klein, 
1998)”.5 Epistemic infinitism (along with its rival theories of coherentism 
                                                             
5Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [http://www.iep.utm.edu/inf-epis/]. Klein 
and Turri further summarize the landscape: Foundationalists, coherentists, and 
infinitists “agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately 
structured chain of reasons. What form may such a chain take? Foundationalists 
opt for non-repeating finite chains. Coherentists (at least linear coherentists) opt 
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and foundationalism) is a counter, not a surrender, to skepticism. The key 
idea is that the justification regress is not absurd, so it is not the case that 
all beliefs are thrown into doubt. Infinitism holds that any reason can be 
subject to further legitimate challenge; it does not involve embarking on 
the kind of self-justificatory regress we have seen related to the RSA 
criteria, e.g., a Carroll-type regress. There being a potentially infinite 
series of non-repeating reasons in favour of a proposition does not mean 
that one can actually give them; according to infinitism, the reasons might 
continue to be available, although of course at some point one will have 
to stop producing them. Yet any such series of justificatory reasons, as 
that very description suggests, is illuminating or explanatory—progress 
is made, justification is enhanced—which contrasts starkly with a 
Carroll-type regress (understood as related to the RSA sufficiency 
criterion). The only thing these two types of infinite series really have in 
common is that they may each be generated by interminable Why?-
questions. But my point is that you are always getting somewhere (at 
least in theory) with your child, unlike Achilles ever gets with the Tortoise 
in Carroll’s tale. To the Tortoise’s questioning, Achilles gives the same 
answer, recursively repeated over and over. 
The idea of the dialectical tier is perhaps the most prominent case 
of an infinite “regress problem” in informal logic that epistemic infinitism 
addresses. Johnson’s discussion of the dialectical tier may be best known. 
He says “arguments in the paradigmatic sense require a dialectical tier in 
which the arguer discharges his or her dialectical obligations: i.e., 
anticipates objections, deals with alternative positions, etc.” (2003, p. 43). 
Since this involves responses to objections (or alternatives), responses to 
objections to those first responses, responses to objections to those 
second responses, and so on, Govier famously contended that this “would 
be a staircase that mounts forever. A theory demanding such an explosion 
is not a realistic or coherent one” (1999, p. 233). Epistemic infinitism 
would insist that this series is not vicious or incoherent, but of course 
would allow that the activity of proving cannot go on forever. Natural 
                                                             
for repeating finite chains. Infinitists opt for non-repeating infinite chains.” As 
here, infinitists tend not to make much of the distinction between a posteriori 
and a priori beliefs, but according to Aikin, it constitutes a reason to adopt 
“impure infinitism”: “there is nothing prima facie incoherent with the thought 
that an infinite series of inferential justification could have other factors at play 
than inferential relations between beliefs. Some beliefs are more intuitive than 
others, some beliefs are caused by occurrent experiential states, and some beliefs 
have a kind of formal character to them that all stand as sui generic evidence” 
(2011, p. 59). 
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stopping points, provisional as they might be, would be provided by 
pragmatic conditions of dialectical adequacy. 
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